The Future of Britain's WMD

Executive summary

This report discusses the successor to Britain's Trident nuclear missile system. It examines British dependence on the United States and concludes that most of the discussion on the replacement is based on the false premise that the UK has an independent nuclear weapon. To support this conclusion, the re port reviews the history of Britain's involvement with nuclear weapons from 1940 to the present day to show a sixty-year-old pattern of British dependence on the US for Weapons of Mass Destruction (W MD).

The report also concludes that Trident should not be replaced and should be phased out now, as neither Trident nor any US-supported successor would meet the 1940 requirement' for a system that the nation can rely on if it stands alone as in 1940. Back in the Second World War, the British government concluded it could not be a nuclear power without US support. Half a century later, the dependence remains decisive: President George Bush Snr ordered his officials to produce additional nuclear weapons parts as necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom' (page 14). For fifty years, successive governments have concluded that Britain cannot afford an independent nuclear deterrent. An independent system is not an option.

The nuclear relationship will continue to tie the UK to US policy according to Admiral Raymond Lygo, former Chairman of British Aerospace and director of strategic systems modernisation for the Royal Navy (Page 26). Not replacing Trident is essential for Britain to reclaim freedom of action for the twenty first century, for a Trident replacement may be expected to last until 2060.

The UK should renew the multilateral disarmament agenda which achieved so much in the 1980s and 1990s. It is unrealistic to consider that the world can continue indefinitely with uncontrolled nuclear armaments and not see a nuclear war.

The government should also address a number of technical questions on Britain's WMD and associated technologies:

  1. How can the W MD operated by Britain be used should the United States withdraw its support or act preventively?
  2. Were any reassurances required by the Bush Administration before it renewed the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement in 2004 concerning the direction of British defence and civil nuclear policy?
  3. How near to production is the US-assisted nuclear weapon the Conservative government tested and developed after Trident and cancelled in October 1993?
  4. How much of the spending at Aldermaston is on equipment and services from US companies

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